![]() ![]() It is thus important to understand how the procedures for manpower allocation developed and the progressive nature of the situations with which they attempted to deal. One of the major losers in this reduction was armour. ![]() In 19 the demand was such that the Government had to cut some of its programs. It was not yet a problem at the end of 1940, just before the decision was formally taken to create an armoured division.īut, as time went on, the manpower requirement gradually began to overtake the level of manpower available. This demand was not only for quantity, but also for quality.Īt the beginning of the war, manpower was not regarded as a problem, and it had not become a problem when Minute 375 was recorded on 2 July 1940. ![]() 69 The manpower required for such a project would include a large number of skilled tradesmen to operate machine tools of some complexity. War Cabinet Agendum 150/1940 recommended that 859 cruiser tanks be produced in Australian factories to an Australian design. The second demand for manpower arose from the manufacture of tanks. ![]() Added to this was the need for ancillary and supporting troops, training schools and establishments for the maintenance and repair of equipment. First, troops were required to man the armoured units. The creation of Australian armoured formations placed a significant demand on national manpower in two ways. A formal agendum (Supplement 2 to Agendum 150) was submitted to Cabinet on 14 December. This request was reinforced by General Blamey’s view that the Australian Army needed two armoured divisions to complement its four infantry divisions, thus creating a balanced national force. In that month Cabinet requested action on the armoured division which had been proposed in Agendum 150 in June. The impetus behind this thrust was lost when Street was tragically killed on 13 August and it was not regained until November. The original agendum was conditionally approved by Cabinet Minute 375 on 2 July 1940 and Supplement 1 on 10 July by Minute 407. The Minister for the Army, Geoffrey Street, was the protagonist in this action and, on his recommendation, Agendum 150/1940 was presented to Cabinet. There had been some stirrings to create a tank force in the early months of the war, but it was not until the second wake-up call, the German conquest of France, that the War Cabinet began to take action. 68Īt the end of 1940 Australia had been at war for fifteen months. On 28 December, Major R.A. Perkins, Australian Staff Corps, was appointed Acting Commandant of the AFV School, which had the initial function of training instructors who would then become the staff of the School. Arrangements are also being made with the War Office for a senior officer of the Royal Armoured Corps to be made available for instructional duties in Australia. The production of carriers is proceeding, and to date 139 have been accepted from the contractors.Ĭolonel Watson has been in the USA investigating tank production, and is now on his way to Australia. Regarding the production of cruiser tanks in Australia, the Ministry of Munitions has advised that an organisation can be set up in Australia to carry out the design and production of prototype tanks. The manufacture of AFVs by the Ministry of Munitions has been the subject of correspondence and frequent conferences with the Director of Ordnance Production and the Director-General of Munitions. The matter of tank production has been the subject of several discussions with the War Office regarding the type of tank to be produced in Australia and the General Staff specification for a cruiser tank has now been circulated. ![]()
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